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Abstract 
This essay critically examines the view of Keynes on the reform of the 
international monetary system. We then apply modern monetary and banking 
theory, where money is redefined as a pure numerical vehicle in contrast to 
money being defined as a net asset, to appraise those elements that are required 
for a functioning and efficient international monetary system. It is suggested that 
Keynes’ view are still very much relevant today if the world is to move from the 
present non-system of international monetary arrangements to a system  where 
currencies would no longer be perceived as net assets and countries would no 
longer be grouped as key and non-key currency countries. 
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Introduction 
  In 19981, at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, finance ministers 
of 22-countries formed a working group to discuss proposals whose aim is to create 
ultimately a ‘new architecture’ for the world monetary system. It means that the present 
international monetary arrangement is faulty.  
 The world has seen so far three types of international monetary arrangements or 
systems: The gold standard, the gold-exchange standard, and the present floating 
exchange rate system. Economists are well aware of these standards so that we do not 
need to elaborate on them. What we need to realize is that the gold standard and the 
gold-exchange standard actually stand for the sterling standard and the dollar exchange 
standard, respectively. The use of the two standards coincides with the economic 
position occupied by Great Britain prior to 1931 and the United States up to 1971. Each 
of the two standards was founded upon the ability of these two economies to provide 
the means of payments for the increasing volume of world trade and payments. But 
since the two standards were based on the commodity gold, a point is reached when the 
two countries can no longer cope: Sterling exchange standard collapsed in 1931, after 
an unsuccessful attempt by Britain to return to the pre-war level of exchange rate; and 
dollar exchange standard collapsed in 1971 when convertibility was suspended or more 
accurately when the gold content of the dollar was stripped off so that the dollar 
becomes in effect a mere IOU issued by the American banking system. 
 Since 1971 nearly all countries have instituted the floating exchange rate regimes. 
What we need to note is that the Bretton Woods arrangement in which the dollar is 
made to exchange against gold at a price of $35/ounce has been jettisoned. But while 
the regime of payments has changed from gold-exchange to the present multiple 
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  See International Economic Trends, Feb. 2000. 
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currency standard, the two institutions that were established to provide the necessary 
framework for the efficient working of the Bretton Woods system - the then world 
monetary system proper - continue to operate as if the world has a ‘world monetary 
system’ in place. The contradiction of the present arrangement is that while the world 
has no systematic monetary arrangement in place, it continues to support institutions 
that were made for the then world monetary system. In short, presently we have a 
non-system of payments in place; whilst the framework for supporting the then 
systematic payment arrangements is now used to support a non-system of international 
payment arrangements. The pathological system now in place has created the need for a 
reexamination of the present arrangement and the creation of a new architecture of 
international payments.  
 This paper addresses the need for a new world monetary system by 
reappraising some of the key elements proposed by Keynes. These requirements, as 
will become clear in the following pages, are still very much relevant today. In the 
following section we look critically at those elements that characterize the present 
world monetary system, which are hampering the smooth functioning of the system. 
The two elements we shall consider are (1) the double standard of value and 
international reserve assets. It shall be seen that the problems of the present 
international monetary arrangement are hinged on these two elements. 
 
1.1 The double standard of value 
A domestic currency that equally serves as international standard becomes a double 
standard of value. At one extreme it is the standard by which domestic production is 
measured, and, at the other extreme, it is the standard by which production, which 
occurred elsewhere, is also measured. At home it serves this function well, as it 
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rigorously obeys the rules that 'money should not have a price.' But as soon as it began 
to serve as international standard it becomes an object with a price tag subject to 
purchase and sale. This dual character of a currency whose function goes beyond the 
banking system which issues it serves to expose the inadequacy of the present system of 
international payments. It led to what Rueff (1967) called the ‘two pyramids of credit,’ 
a duplication of credit arising out of the use of a national currency as international 
standard. The volatility of exchange rates and the dominance of finance over trade is the 
result of the existence of double standard of value. The emergence of the Eurodollar 
market where dollar deposits are re-invested offshore for whatever reason is a result of 
the role of double standard of value, which the dollar is made to play. This also led to 
the difficulties experienced by countries not only in international payments but in the 
accumulation of debts as well - the two ever threatening the stability of the world 
monetary and financial system. It should be noted that the existence of the double 
standard of value or what can properly be called the ‘dollar standard’, since for a long 
term the dollar has been serving this dual role, arose out of the then Bretton Woods 
payment arrangements. It was never imposed by the United States on the rest of world.  
 Another outcome of the Bretton Woods arrangement is the need for countries to 
keep international reserves in order to back up the external value of their domestic 
currencies. Despite the demise of the Bretton Woods arrangement, international 
reserves remain an essential component of the present world monetary system. We 
shall look into the nature of external reserves in order to see whether they are capable of 
backing the international value of domestic currencies.  
 
1.2 External reserves and the international value of domestic currency. 
A look at the volatility of exchange rates suggests that countries upon countries are 
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losing the battle in their attempts to stabilize the exchange rates through what is known 
as ‘managed float’. If, despite the accumulation of large reserves, exchange rates 
remain volatile; then it does mean that either the accumulation of external reserves is 
incapable of assuring the stability of the external value of the domestic currency or 
central banks are incapable of maintaining stable exchange rates through the 
instruments of monetary policies. What then are external reserves and why do countries 
need them? 
 External reserves are internationally recognized ‘assets’ that a country 
accumulates in order to back the international value of its domestic currency and to 
meet the criterion of credit worthiness in international transactions. The emergence of 
this requirement can be traced back to over half a century ago when several countries 
met at a conference in Bretton Woods, to fashion out a new international monetary 
order. The assets that were to serve as the components of international reserves include: 
gold and convertible currencies; later Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was added. 
These were regarded and accepted as ‘assets’. That is, they are accepted as real goods 
(in much the same way as a non-monetary financial bonds). In order to evaluate 
whether external reserves can adequately serve as a cover for the international value of 
a domestic currency, we need to enquire into the nature of those assets that are used as 
international reserves. For any asset to serve as external reserves its value must be 
stable; otherwise variations in its value lead to variations in the domestic currency to 
which it is anchored. Let us take each of the three most widely used international 
reserves assets (gold, reserve currencies and SDRs), to see whether they meet this 
criterion. 
First, consider gold. Gold is a commodity that has two distinct properties: a 
use-value and an exchange value. Beside the use of gold for personal aggrandizement 
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and its usage in the industry, gold was also used as a means of exchange – first at the 
national level, then at the international level. That is gold performed the functions of 
money: basically, a measure and a store of value. The uniqueness of gold does not, 
however, single it out as a unique and invariable measure of value. The value of gold 
can vary due to several factors, particularly changes in production conditions and 
variations in its price due to changes in demand and supply.  In addition 'gold's 
negligible elasticity of production (i.e a normally small, annual growth of its supply not 
determined by its price) explains not only its most attractive characteristic for use as 
world money but ironically also its gradual demise. There simply has not been enough 
additional gold available world-wide to satisfy the growing needs for international 
liquidity in the wake of expanding world trade. Consequently, gold as commodity 
money has been gradually replaced by credit money both in domestic circulation and as 
world money (Guttman, 1988, p.53). Any commodity that must serve as money ought 
to have a stable value; otherwise, if its value varies continuously as all other 
commodities which it was supposed to measure, then difficulties arise as to how to 
measure the value of all other commodities. Variations in the value of gold thus make it 
devoid of both a necessary and sufficient condition as a means of measuring the value 
of all other commodities and of serving as a repository of value.  
Despite this shortcoming of gold, it is still being used as a means of payment, 
although only at the international level; and it is one of the commodities traded in 
commodity exchanges around the world. At the national level, gold is no longer seeing 
as a measure of value or as a means of exchange. Bank money devoid of any 
commodity affiliation has taken over. But as we have said earlier, old habits die hard so 
that, at the international level, gold still commands respect. As a result, countries still 
accumulate idle metals in their vaults, even though in modern economies, its 
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proportional use, even at the international level has shrunk. A look at the table below 
shows that while foreign currencies have become the dominant reserve assets, gold and 
SDRs have fallen to a point where their use as means of international payments have 
become negligible. Gold, from being the dominant means of payments in the 1920s fell 
to 18% of the total value of assets used as international means of payment by 1976. In 
fact by 1998, it constitutes about 3%. SDRs have also not fared better. We shall have 
more to say on the relative importance of SDRs later in this section. What we need to 
note for now is that it too, like gold, has suffered a severe decline to the extent that by 
1998 it accounts for approximately a mere 2% of the total value of international reserve 
assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
International liquidity 
 
  1929   1976   1998 
  US$b  % US$b  % US$b  % 
Gold 10.2  69 42  18 33,786.6a 2.8 
Currency   4.5  31 166  70 1,166,206b 95.5 
SDRs    -   - 28  12 20,379.7c 1.68 
Sources:  IMF, International Financial Statistics, vol. L11, 1999. 
a, b, c, are valued in SDRs 
 
Nevertheless, gold is still very much present. Any look at the assets side of Central 
Banks balance sheets will confirm its importance. But given the present circumstances 
in which bank money has overtaken the use of gold as money, is it still meaningful to 
accumulate this metal as a means for backing the international value of a domestic 
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currency? Definitely not. Today most international payments are carried out with the 
use of one or a few key currencies such as the US dollar, Euro or Japanese Yen. 
Furthermore, accumulating gold reserves yields little or nothing in return. Since gold is 
experiencing decreasing share in the total amount of external reserves, how then can its 
accumulation back the international value of domestic currencies, when, instead, the 
use of key currencies has largely taken over as a means of international reserves? How 
can, in addition, as we have pointed out earlier, a commodity whose value varies be 
employed as a means of stabilizing the value of domestic currencies? It is simply 
impossible. Gold, then, is a relic of the past. Its use as a means of backing the 
international value of a domestic currency has become anachronistic and in the 
construction of any new architecture of international monetary system, it should be 
done away with for good. 
But what about key currencies, that have largely assumed great importance as a 
means of settling international obligations and as a store of value? Given the fact that 
they have largely taken over from gold the role of international money, have they 
performed creditably in supporting the international value of domestic currencies? Save 
for the period of the gold-exchange standard, the answer to this question is negative. 
Let us investigate the nature of currencies used as international standard so as to see 
whether they perform better than gold. 
   The first question we need to ask is this: are key currencies assets? That is to say, 
can we safely regard key currencies as assets (real or financial). A key currency, first 
and foremost, is issued by a national banking system. As a result it constitutes an 
acknowledgement of debt of the banking system that issues it. If that is the case, it 
cannot be regarded as an asset outside the banking system that issues it. First, 
currencies do not pertain to real goods, they are a mere claim on deposits. Second, if we 
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regard them as real, we are saying in effect that the banking system of a country can 
create money out of nothing. It means that we agree to the erroneous association of a 
mere vehicle with purchasing power. As is clearly pointed out by Cencini  
 The primary function of money is that of a unit of account. The 
meaning conveyed by this expression is clear: money is used to 
express real goods and services numerically. It immediately follows 
that money cannot be a commodity (if money were a commodity, it 
would have to be expressed in monetary terms so that money would 
have to be conceived as the unit of account of money itself). To avoid 
any risk of circular reasoning money must be assimilated to numbers. 
This means that money is essentially immaterial. One of the main 
difficulties we are faced with here is to admit of an immaterial entity 
capable of transferring physically heterogeneous goods and services 
into homogeneous commodities. The world of monetary economics 
is real and immaterial at the same time. What distinguishes the 
physical from the economic world is precisely the fact that, thanks to 
money, products are numerically accounted for. In the absence of 
money, products would not be given their economic form, and 
economics would be deprived of its own object of enquiry. (2001, p. 
23) 
Thus a currency issued within a banking system represents the output produced within 
the economy in which it is issued. Banks issue currencies in order to facilitate the 
transfer of income from one economic agent to another. By themselves they are a mere 
token. Neoclassical economics rigorously distinguishes between nominal and real 
variables. Money is a simple numerical vehicle, and currencies are a mere claims 
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‘whose object is a bank deposit’ (ibid.: 23). Consequently, issued by the banking 
system, key currencies used as reserve assets have the value of domestic output. They 
are issued in order to enable domestic economic agents carry out transactions involving 
production and exchange of goods and services and the discharge of debts. At the 
international level, however, there is no international production. All that we have are 
nationally produced goods moving across one country to another. The value of these 
goods has already been accounted for in national money. Their costs of production 
represent the income that is paid to factors in the production process in the form of 
wages, interest, rent and profit. This is why Ricardo in his characteristic acute 
observation of reality said that:  
No extension of foreign trade will immediately increase the amount 
of value in a country, although it will very powerfully contribute to 
increase the mass of commodities and therefore the sum of 
enjoyments. As the value of all foreign goods is measured by the 
quantity of the produce of our land and labor, which is given in 
exchange for them, we should have no greater value, if by the 
discovery of new markets, we obtain double the quantity of ours. 
(1971, p. 147) 
Thus having the value of domestic output, currencies used as reserve assets are devoid 
of any content outside their point of emission. They account for national output where 
they are issued; they cannot at the same time account for what is produced elsewhere; 
for what is produced elsewhere has already been accounted for. In the light of this, it is 
a wonder how the world came to accept the use of a currency issued by a national 
banking system as an international standard and as a store of value. If it is an anomaly to 
use currencies issued at the national level as international standard, is it acceptable to 
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use it as a store of value? 
   In order to perform this task, the value of the currency used as international 
standard must be stable. If its value is not stable, then obviously, the value of domestic 
currency, which is anchored to it cannot remain stable. According to Guttmann: 
Given the large swings of exchange rates since 1971 none of the key 
currencies has functioned as an effective unit of account, with which 
to maintain relatively stable international prices, or performed 
sufficiently well as store of value. (1988, p. 261) 
As we have noted earlier, quite apart from variations arising out of the normal course of 
trade, these currencies are subject to speculative attacks due to their pathological 
nature. Jacque Rueff (1967) pointed this out eloquently. ‘Entering the national banking 
system, but remaining in the debtor country, the claim representing the deposits is thus 
doubled.’ This leads to he called, ‘two pyramids of credit’. The payment of commercial 
deficits in key currencies thus represents double claims by both domestic and foreign 
economic agents. As a result of their pathological nature, the use of these currencies as 
reserve assets do not ensure the stability of the international value of a domestic 
non-key currency. Since they cannot control how their credits are utilized by the 
domestic banking system in which they are deposited, the stability of the non-key 
currency depends on the monetary and fiscal policy pursued by the country enjoying 
the status of key currency. Perhaps then SDRs, being an internationally issued assets 
will perform better than gold and hard currencies as reserve assets, again, the analysis 
below gives cause for doubt. 
SDRs, an acronym for Special Drawing Rights, is a facility that was created by the 
IMF as an international reserve asset alongside the dollar and gold. ‘These special 
drawing rights, created as it were, by a stroke of the pen, will be essentially entries in 
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the books of the Fund’( Schweitser, in Cencini and Schmitt, 1991, p. 80). The value of 
SDRs depends on its acceptance by the participants who shall provide in exchange 
convertible currency or gold. The intention of the Fund was to make SDRs the principal 
reserve asset of the world monetary system. But the question is, are the created SDRs 
any different from the foreign currencies that are used as international standards? 
Issued as a reserve asset, SDRs were therefore thought to be issued with a positive 
value irrespective of their being used at the international level and, thus, irrespective of 
their link with real output. While dollars are issued by the American banking system 
SDRS, however, are created by an international organism, and this seemed enough to 
avoid the injustice of letting a country purchase foreign currencies by the simple 
remittance of its own IOUs. Indeed, if some countries are still not entirely satisfied with 
this situation, it is merely because the SDRs are allocated on the basis of quotas, which 
makes it practically impossible for most LDCs to obtain them without increasing their 
external debt (Cencini and Schmitt, 1991, p. 81). 
 The rate of exchange of SDRs is calculated on the basis of a basket of a few hard 
currencies, an indication that its value cannot be expected to remain stable for long. 
Due to incessant variation in the members of the set of currencies used, the weight will 
continually change. Besides, countries using SDRs have to provide convertible 
currencies, again back to the same problem. In addition, the incapacity of the leading 
industrial countries to agree on the emission of SDRs by the IMF has constantly 
decreased the use of this international facility and postponed sine die the replacement of 
the US dollar by the SDR (ibid.: 82). The declining use of SDRs as compared to the US 
dollar indicates that much of foreign reserve assets will continue to be denominated in 
dollar. (See Table 1.) Consequently SDRs cannot be relied upon as a means of backing 
the international value of a domestic currency. Besides its use is no different from the 
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use of the US dollar. ‘In reality, the use of SDRs as final payment is not essentially 
different from the use of dollars made by USA: in both cases a book-keeping entry of 
no real value is given in exchange for a positive amount of national currencies (ibid.: 
83). If these were the case, why are countries still holding large amount of reserves. 
Accoding to the Economist2, ‘The holding of large official reserves is a hangover from 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, under which countries were obliged 
to defend their parities through official intervention. Yet Bretton Woods broke down 
almost 30 years ago, and the shift to floating exchange rates and the expansion of 
international capital markets, which has improved countries access to foreign 
borrowing should have reduced the need to hold reserves. But global foreign – 
exchange reserves are now higher in relation to trade flows than at almost any time in 
history. The ratio of foreign exchange reserves to imports has risen from 12% in 1969 
to 30% in (2000). The holding of large reserves arises from the weaknesses of the old 
system as it fails to treat symmetrically surplus and deficit countries.’ 
 As we have been arguing, reserve assets are unstable instruments and thus 
incapable of being used as a means of stabilizing the international value of domestic 
currencies. Besides, ‘official reserves are not part of the quantity of money monetizing 
national output and their reduction cannot have, therefore, a deflationary impact within 
the deficit country’ (Cencini, 1995, p. 175).  
 In the new architecture of world monetary system, therefore, they have to be done 
away with completely. 
 
2.0 The basic requirements for an efficient international monetary system 
In order to enunciate an orderly payments arrangement, according to Keynes (see 
                                                 
2
  See The Economist September 2nd 2000. 
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Davidson, 1992, p. 158): 
 We need an instrument of international currency having 
general acceptability between nations…We need an 
orderly and agreed upon method of determining the 
relative exchange values of national currency units…We 
need a quantum of international currency…which is 
governed by the actual current [liquidity] requirements of 
world commerce, and is capable of deliberate 
expansion…We need a method by which the surplus 
credit balances arising from international trade, which 
the recipient does not wish to employ can be set to 
work…without detriment to the liquidity of these 
balances. [Emphasis added]. 
 
 Accordingly, a new world monetary system would need (1) an international currency, 
(2) a new method to determine relative exchange rates, (3) a quantum of international 
currency that will match the need of world trade, and (4) a new method by which 
surpluses arising out of trade will be channelled to productive use. These requirements 
as we shall see below are interrelated. We turn now to consider the four basic 
requirements for an effective international monetary system, which were first 
enunciated by Keynes 
 
2.1 International currency and a clearing union 
Keynes’ plan is anchored on the creation of a supranational institution that will be 
responsible for providing the means for settling international imbalances among 
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countries. This institution was to be designated an International Clearing Union (ICU). 
The Union will be responsible for homogenizing the world’s monetary space for both 
surplus and deficit countries by generalizing ‘the essential principle of banking as it is 
exhibited within any closed system. This principle is the necessary, equality of credits 
and debits’ (Keynes, in Cencini, 1991, p. 108). As is well known, money issued within 
the domestic banking system of a country has the value of the output produced in that 
country as its object. The financial intermediaries are responsible for conveying, with 
the issue of money, income produced within the economy, from one economic agent to 
another. In order for this operation to apply smoothly within the financial system of the 
domestic economy, a central bank is required to reconcile the balances of the financial 
intermediaries through the provision of a clearing facility. The business of clearing has 
been going on since the creation of central banks, and central banks appeared to have 
performed this role excellently. This role is performed by the application of simple 
double entry accounting to banking, in which, ‘no credits can be removed outside the 
clearing system, but only transferred within it ' (Cencini, 1995, p. 113). 
 Payments made to economic agents are instantly recorded as deposits to their 
benefits within the banking system. The debit of the payer defines the credit of payee. If 
this principle was to be extended to the international level, then obviously two things 
are required: an International Clearing Union and a world currency. In order to achieve 
this ‘we need an instrument of international currency having general acceptability 
between nations, so that blocked balances and bilateral clearings are unnecessary…’ 
(Keynes, in Cencini, 1995, p. 137). There is then a need for an international currency 
capable of conveying international incomes among countries. This currency is to be 
called ‘bancor’ according to Keynes. The bancor defined in terms of gold was to be 
used as the sole means of international payments.  
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The proposal is to establish a currency union, here designated an 
International Clearing Union, based on international bank money, 
called (let us say) bancor, fixed (but not unalterably) in terms of gold 
and accepted as the equivalent of gold by the British Commonwealth 
and the United States and all the other members of the Union for the 
purpose of settling international balances (ibid.: 137). 
The bancor thus homogenizes the world’s monetary space in a heterogeneous currency 
world. It becomes a numerical vehicle whose value derives from its association with 
gold. The beauty of the Keynes’ plan appear to be that by analogy to what happens at 
the national level, the clearing institution would provide its clients with the currency 
necessary for international circulation, being certain to recover the money it creates and 
which, transferred from the importing to exporting country, defines the deposit of the 
latter. As claimed by Keynes, the Clearing Union would never be uncovered, since the 
debt of a country would always be matched by the credit of another country, and, 
therefore, by its deposit in bancor with the World Bank. This does not mean that a 
country can import without limits, in the certainty that its net purchases are 
automatically financed by an equivalent deposit of exporting countries. The equality of 
debits and credits implies no mechanism of this sort. In order to effectively pay for its 
net commercial imports, a country must sell bonds of an equal amount, and this sale can 
certainly not be ensured by the simple monetary intermediation carried out by the 
International Clearing Union. Hence, whereas monetary equilibrium is always 
guaranteed by the book-keeping principle, financial equilibrium requires the World 
Bank to intervene in its function as financial intermediary (ibid.: 140). 
 Despite the great advance which Keynes plan contains, the issue that members of 
the Union should accept the bancor ‘as if it were gold’ became contentious. This is the 
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way Cencini put the matter: 
Now, national and international money do not pertain to the same 
category. National currencies do not effectively derive their value 
from gold, but from the production of goods and services they are 
associated with. The bancor, on the contrary, cannot find its value in 
any international production (since world output is simply the sum of 
national outputs). Hence, while gold parity is superfluous at the 
national level, as far as the bancor is concerned, it seems necessary to 
link it with a particular good of indisputable value such as gold. At 
this point the problem becomes complicated. If countries are bound 
to accept the bancor according to its gold parity, and if the bancor is 
created by the World Bank on request of Clearing Union members, 
how is it possible to simultaneously provide the world, with the 
necessary international liquidity and avoid the emission of money 
which is not backed by the necessary reserves? (ibid.: 141). 
However, this shortcoming in the Keynes’ plan can easily be removed if we are ready 
to accept the fact that money, whether national or international should be regarded as 
was pointed out by Keynes himself, as ‘bank money’. Thus a redefinition of money is 
called for. 
 
2.2 A redefinition of money 
Money has usually been regarded as anything that is generally accepted as a medium of 
exchange. Its functions include a measure of value, a unit of account and a store of 
value. Commodities of various shades and varieties have, at one time or another, served 
as money. The historical development of money has shown that money evolved from 
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being a commodity (a real good) into a mere token. Modern day money is, however, 
essentially bank money. In his Treatise on Money, Keynes classified money into two: 
money and money of account. According to Keynes  
Money of account, namely that in which debts and prices and general 
purchasing power are expressed, is the primary concept of money. A 
money of account comes into existence along with debts which are 
contracts for deferred payment, and price lists, which are offers of 
contracts for sale or purchase. Such debts and price lists, whether 
they are recorded by word of mouth or by book entry on baked bricks 
or paper documents, can only be expressed in terms of money of 
account. Money itself, namely that by delivery of which debt 
contracts and price contracts are discharged, and in the shape of 
which a store of general purchasing power is held, derives its 
character from its relationship to the money of account, since the 
debts and prices must first have been expressed in terms of the latter. 
(1971, p.  3) 
He continues to say that: 
Something which is merely used as a convenient medium of 
exchange on the spot may approach to being money, in as much as it 
may represent a means of holding general purchasing power. But if 
this is all, we have scarcely emerged from the stage of barter. Money 
proper in the full sense of the term can only exist in relation to money 
of account(ibid.:3).  
Having made this distinction, Keynes went on to say that 'Bank money is simply an 
acknowledgement of a private debt, expressed in the money of account, which is used 
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by passing from one hand to another, alternatively with money proper, to settle a 
transaction.' The clue Keynes gave us as to the proper meaning of money lies in the fact 
that 'all the current money in the hands of the public is member bank money, i.e bank 
deposits'(ibid.: 27). Money is then a simple numerical form, which is issued by the 
banking system in carrying out its functions as facilitator of payments and financial 
go-between – transferring value from one economic agent to another. This line of 
thought was vigorously pursued by Cencini (1995, p. 3), arguing that ‘money is a very 
peculiar object, which has too often been mistaken for a real good.’ Modern monetary 
theory teaches that it is anachronistic to conceive money from a physical point of view. 
‘By creating money, banks simply provide the economy with a numerical means of 
payment, the object of the payment being derived from the association of money with 
current output’ (ibid.:3). Money then is not a commodity, a real good, but a pure 
numerical form that is used to convey real goods from one economic agent to another. 
Money and current output does display an identity from which one cannot be 
disentangled from the other. An understanding of money in this way is very crucial, as 
it helps to avoid the mixing of money proper with its object – the real goods that it helps 
to circulate. To avoid confusion, money and financial assets need to be rigorously 
separated. 
 
    2.21 Money and financial assets 
 If ‘impossible’ lives in utopia, it is certainly not utopian to suppose 
that, once achieved, scientific progress may take hold of people’s 
mind, especially if the well-being of whole populations depends on 
it…Bank money is a means of payment and not a net asset  (bank 
money is an object of mediation and not a final product)…(See 
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Schmitt, in Cencini, 2000, p. 19) [italics in the original] 
Given the fact that money is simply a numerical form issued by the banking 
system so that it cannot be equated to real goods; can financial assets be 
regarded as real goods? The answer to this question is, unmistakably, positive. 
The reason is that financial assets are issued as promises to pay future income 
for the use of current one. This is because ‘While money is a simple numerical 
vehicle allowing the flow of payments, credit implies a financial transfer of 
income. While money has no value of its own and can indeed be created, 
income derives from production and defines an absolute exchange between a 
real and a monetary deposit’ (Cencini 2007: 7). Accordingly, ‘Credit is 
concerned with the lending of such a deposit. It appears thus that the supply of 
credit must be kept distinct from that of money. The monetarist concept of 
money is ill-founded because assuming money to be a positive asset, it 
confuses money with income. In fact it is income that is a positive asset. The 
supply of credit is the supply of a positive amount of income and acquires the 
existence of a bank deposit( a stock), whereas the supply of money refers to 
the capacity of banks to convey payments(flows) on behalf of their clients. By 
failing to distinguish clearly between these two functions (monetary and 
financial intermediations) carried out by banks, economists have been led to 
develop an anachronistic conception of money, inconsistent with its 
book-keeping nature and incapable of explaining the working of our monetary 
economics of production’ (ibid.: 7).   
 The analysis above applies equally to all financial assets: bonds, commercial 
paper, etc. A bond, for example, is a simple promise to pay a sum (called principal and 
interest), at a future date. The issuer of the bond seeks current income. The holder of the 
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bond, on the other hand, agrees to part with current income for future income. Thus 
bonds and other non-monetary financial assets represent real goods. Our so-called 
international ‘reserve assets’ do not meet this simple criterion and that is why they are 
to be dispensed with in the construction of any new architecture of international 
monetary system. This leads us into another element of the new international monetary 
system: the required exchange rate regime.  
 
 
 
2.3 Freely floating absolute exchange rate regime 
There are two additional elements, aside from removing protective tariffs and other 
impediments to free trade, that are required in order for trade to flourish unhindered 
among nations: first, a flexible exchange rate regime, and second an exchange rate that 
is stable over time. This much is recognized. However while the first is achievable, the 
second, due to several factors, namely volatility of financial flows, speculative 
behavior, financial fragility, contiguous effects, etc, is difficult or almost impossible to 
achieve. Over thirty years after floating exchange rate regimes become operational in 
the major industrialized countries and in much of the developing countries, a stable 
exchange rate has become a mere fiction. Moreover, despite the responses of economic 
actors to limit the devastating effects and to insulate themselves against adverse 
movements in exchange rates through the creation of hedging instruments, it appears 
that the instruments are weak so that they are incapable of moving against large swings 
in exchange rates. The time has thus come to reexamine this problems so as to kill two 
birds with one stone: to achieve stable exchange rates in the face of floating exchange 
rates. For each economic actor, for each country, and for the world economy as a whole, 
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this would represent the desired state they have been yearning for. 
 In traditional analysis of exchange rates, exchange rates are regarded as the 
relative prices of national currencies when exchanged against one another, because 
money is regarded as a net asset. This leads to the application of the tools of demand 
and supply in order to determine the relative price of foreign exchange. But if modern 
money cannot be regarded as a net asset but as a purely vehicular means of mediating 
exchange, then the conception of money as a net asset has to be abandoned in favor of 
the superior conception of money as a two sided coin: as an asset on one side and a 
liability on the other. Thus the first task is to recognize modern money as bank money – 
a mere acknowledgement of debt issued by the banking system. It is a mere I.O.U. 
Bank money is both an asset and a liability. And as such it must not have a price. It is 
represented by simple book-keeping entries. Thus money cannot be assimilated to real 
goods it is made to circulate. Once this is recognized, the idea of an absolute exchange 
rate becomes easy to grasp.  Cencini put it succinctly as follows: 
 The transition from relative to absolute exchange rates is 
…that from a system in which money is an object of 
payment to one in which money is a means of payment; 
from a system in which money is itself an asset to one in 
which real and financial assets are ‘circulated’ by money. 
It is the circular use of money that, as in Keynes’s plan of 
reform, allows for the stability of exchange rate. (1995, p. 
14) 
For this to be achieved, it will require two interrelated factors: (i) a reciprocal demand 
for currencies, and (ii) the sale and purchase of financial bonds. In a regime of absolute 
exchange rate no foreign currency is to be entered on the assets side of a net exporting 
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country’s balance sheet as the final counterpart of its net commercial exports. Payments 
made by net importers should immediately flow back into its banking system paving 
the way for the sale of financial assets (shares or bonds) as a means of settling its 
international payments. ‘This means that a net commercial surplus must be 
counterbalanced by an equivalent net purchase of securities, the country whose balance 
of trade is in surplus being a net importer on the financial market’ (Cencini, 2000, p. 
15). This means that as soon as its net commercial exports are paid for, the surplus 
country would not enter a sum of foreign currencies on the assets side of its banking 
system’s balance sheet, but instead use the sum to purchase foreign securities. A regime 
of absolute exchange rate will thus see to it that no country can use  its currency as the 
final means of payments. If eventually an international monetary unit is created – call it 
bancor, unitas, icu, and so on – this regime will find its logical expression in the unit 
chosen as the international standard. For then, ‘each national currency is changed into 
the international money and not exchanged against it or against another national 
currency’ (ibid.: 15). 
 The problem with the present international monetary system is that it allows 
apparently the exchange of equivalents, but in actual fact, real goods are exchanged for 
mere acknowledgement of debt. The payment system is asymmetrical. This is due to 
the existence of what is known as the ‘reserve currency’. Given two countries in which 
one is a reserve and the other a nonreserve currency country, the former is given the 
privilege to pay its net commercial imports in its own money. That is by simply 
transferring to its creditors a claim on its own deposits. But these deposits have by no 
means constituted final payment to its creditors. In other to effectively pay its creditors, 
the reserve currency country ought to sell to its creditors financial assets of equivalent 
value or be a net exporter of goods and services. If this transaction occurs between a 
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reserve and a nonreserve currency country, the purchase of these assets by the latter 
would represent claims on the future output of the former. Until the nonreserve 
currency country receives this output, the reserve currency country has not made 
effective payments for its net commercial imports. With the existence of international 
money and a clearing union in which the rules of double-entry book-keeping will be 
made to rigorously apply, equivalent output will be transferred instantaneously 
between the two countries, and the four requirements outlined by Keynes in his reform 
plan will become fully operational. 
 
  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The analysis above indicated some of the elements that will need to be incorporated in 
any new arrangement of international monetary system. The new arrangement will do 
away with debt servicing difficulties and the existence of ‘two pyramids of credits,’ 
which is a source of instability for the world economy. To put the new arrangement on 
a sound footing will need a redefinition of money, the separation of the creation of 
money and financial intermediation, and the creation of a global currency unit. We 
believe that an integrated financial market should be created with a clearing house 
whose responsibility is to issue world money and to monitor agreed upon world 
monetary policy – a monetary policy that will serve as a guide for national monetary 
policies. This we have done in the hope to stimulate the discovery of other elements by 
those who are strongly interested in seeing to the emergence of a global monetary 
system that is capable of launching the world economy back on the track of growth and 
development. 
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